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Slave Labor in Nuremberg's I.G. Farben Case: The
Lonely Voice of Paul M. Hebert
*°
Alberto L Zuppi
INTRODUCTION

The use of forced labor during an armed conflict was the
State's common practice for filling up the gaps left behind by the
requirements of the human war machine. At the time of World
War II, the work of prisoners of war (POWs) was considered,
among other dispositions, by the 1899 Hague Regulations and the
1929 Geneva Conventions,I and the forced working of the civilian
population was delimited to exceptional circumstances by the
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor.2
Even in America, the use of forced labor of German POWs
during the war accomplished some primary tasks. In 1943, the
sugar cane crop in Louisiana might conceivably have been lost
without them.3 However, the rules concerning the treatment of
POWs and the civilian population of the occupied territories were
totally disregarded by the Axis powers during World War II. The
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.

LL. B. 1975 University of Bs.As. (UBA), Dr. iur. 1989 Saarland
University (FRG), Robert & Pamela Martin Associate Professor, Paul M. Hebert
Law Faculty, Louisiana State University (LSU). This article was possible
thanks to a summer grant offered by the Law Center. I wish to thank the fine
suggestions of my colleagues from LSU, John Costonis, and Saul Litvinoff.
Thanks to Randy Thompson for his help in obtaining difficult materials, James
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1. Annex to the Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land (Hague II) art. 6, July 29, 1899, 187 C.T.S. 436, and Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47
Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343. See also Brussels Conference on the Rules of
Military Warfare, Aug. 27, 1874, 148 C.T.S. 133; Howard S. Levie, The
Employment ofPrisonersof War, 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 318, 319 (1963).
2. ILO No. 29, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, entered into force May 1, 1932, available
at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C029 (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
3. See generallyJoseph T. Butler, Jr., Prisonerof War Labor in the Sugar
Cane Fieldsof Lafourche Parish,Louisiana:1943-1944, 14 Louisiana Hist. 283
(1973).
*
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systematic annihilation of detainees and the enslavement of
workers for the production of war materials reached a climax
during the Nazi dominion over Europe. Never before in the history
of mankind was there such a disregard or criminal omission of the
most elementary rules protecting the civil population and captive
enemy combatants.
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the question of
forced and slave labor by German firms during World War II due
to the discussions and final creation of the Foundation
"Remembrance, Responsibility and Future."4 More than six
thousand German firms that used forced or slave labor during the
Nazi period contributed to the establishment of a fund of more than
five billion German marks (Deutsche Mark or DM). That money
will be used to pay a personal indemnification to those who were
submitted to that kind of work or to their heirs. However, the
individual damages were limited to a pre-fixed maximum sum of
5,000 DM for "forced labor" and 15,000 DM for "slave labor,"
understanding that the latter took place in concentration camps.
From the beginning of the discussions to establish the fund,
German corporations were adamantly against the acceptance of
any legal liability and instead preferred to assert a "moral
obligation" as justification for their grudging contributions to the
fund.5
Sixty years have elapsed since the international prosecution of
the major Nazi criminals in Nuremberg, but the horrors and
abominations shown in 1946 remain an obdurate abhorrence in the
collective memory. One of the twelve main cases after the major
trial in Nuremberg was exclusively concerned with the criminal
activity of the most important German business consortium in
history.6 The members of the board of I. G. Farben were
4. See Gesetz zur Errichtung eine Stiftung "Erinnerung, Verantwortung,
Zukunft" [Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future], in BGBI 2000 1 1263
and 2001 12036. For the English version, see http:llwww.stiftungsinitiative.de
eindex.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
5. Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A
Critique of the German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced
Laborersof the ThirdReich, 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 5 (2002).
6. The Trial of Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) was held in Nuremberg. See generally 1-42 Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (1947) (USA, France, UK,
and USSR v. Hermann Goering et al.). This trial was followed by twelve other
cases. This paper analyzes case number six, U.S. v. Carl Krauch et al. (1947),
known as the "I.G. Farben Case." 7-8 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (U.S. Gov't
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prosecuted for helping Hitler to reach power, to wage aggressive
war, and for the commission of crimes against humanity,
especially the building up of a factory using slave labor in the most
emblematic of concentration camps: Auschwitz.
In spite of the overwhelming criminal implications of operating
a factory with slave labor in Auschwitz, the American Tribunal in
that case rendered a surprisingly lenient judgment against some
members of the consortium and acquitted the rest of all major
charges. The defendants were highly educated, belonging to a
scientific and managerial aristocracy of inventors, Nobel Prize
recipients, and entrepreneurs.7 How can one even conceive that
such a highly respected elite could have consented to the use of
concentration camp inmates until their collapse? Albeit, if such an
accusation was true, how could an American Tribunal in occupied
Germany be lenient with it? Only one member of the Tribunal
delivered a dissenting opinion in relation to the slave labor
account. This paper is concerned with him and his role in that
trial.
In the first part of the paper, I will refer briefly to the origin of
the post International Military Tribunal (IMT) Nuremberg
Tribunals, held in the midst of the rubble of Germany, under the
ominous shade of a menacing Soviet Union, and the consequent
pressure of what would be known as "the Cold War." A brief
history of the Farben group is included in this section. In the
second part, I will turn my attention to the Farben case itself, the
way it was presented by the Prosecution, and the Tribunal's
judgment, including a synopsis of the majority's arguments
regarding aggression and slave labor. In the last part of the paper,
I will analyze the criticisms of Judge Hebert and study the
American attitude toward German industrialists on one side, and
the American policy regarding war crimes prosecution on the
other. I will also discuss the evolution of the subject matter
beyond the context of Nuremberg. The conclusions, I hope, will
help to explain an unfinished dilemma and its consequences, as
well as to realize its further implications for some of the

Printing Office 1953) (known as the "Green Series") [hereinafter Trials of War
Criminals].
7. Matthew Lippman, The Other Nuremberg: American Prosecution of
Nazi War Criminalsin Occupied Germany, 3 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 88
(1992).
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international crimes now determined by the Rome Statute for the
establishment of the International Criminal Court.8
I. GERMANY GROUND ZERO
During the summer of 1946, when the IMT judging of major
war criminals was still under way, the representatives of the
military authorities occupying Germany were deciding the
feasability of preparing a second Nuremberg Trial before a new
and consecutive IMT. 9 However, no further action was going to be
taken before the first IMT rendered a final judgment, 10 which
finally happened on October 1, 1946.11
When submitting his final report to President Truman, Robert
H. Jackson, the Chief American Prosecutor, recommended that any
future trials would be more expeditiously resolved if they were
held in national or occupation courts rather than in an international
tribunal.' 2 It is important to be aware of the sense of urgency
Time was running out for
which exudes from his report.
punishment, and the large and somber specter of another war
lurked on the horizon.
On January 27, 1947, the U.S. Government informed its allies
that it would proceed with the trial of various German war
criminals through "Occupation Tribunals" which were to be
established in the American Zone. 13 The jurisdictional foundation
of these Occupation Tribunals, subsequent to the first IMT trial,
8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), U. N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.
htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
9. Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10, 22 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office 1949). Peter Maguire, Law and War: An American Story
(Columbia Univ. Press 2001), affirms that two tribunals, one for the main Nazi
officers and the second for the industrialists, were planned from the very
beginning, and when the moment arrived, only the main Nazi war criminals
were prosecuted.
10. Taylor, supra note 9, at 26.
11. See Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal (1946), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm
#proc (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
12. See Robert H. Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States
Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London 1945
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1949).
13. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 285 n.1. See also Sheldon Glueck, By What
TribunalShall War Offenders be Tried?, 24 Nebraska Law Review 143 (1945).
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was Control Council Law (CCL) No. 10, a hybrid between
international and national law. 14 This instrument, issued by all
four Occupant Powers and based on the Charter of the IMT,
defined in a larger form the crimes which would be prosecuted and
the rights and duties of each occupying power.
A. Assembling the Subsequent Tribunals
One day after Jackson's resignation, Military Government
Ordinance No. 7 was issued providing details for the composition15
of subsequent tribunals and the rules that would govern them.
Each tribunal was to consist of three members and one alternate
judge. All sources agree that it was a considerably difficult task to
obtain the desired number of qualified jurists for the future
courts. 16 The Military Governor, with the advice of the Director of
the Legal Division, would determine which judges to aIPoint to
each particular tribunal and who would preside over them.
At the beginning of 1947, thirty-two names were selected,
including twenty-five who were or had been State court judges, six
prominent practicing attorneys, and only one law school dean:
Paul Macarius Hebert, Dean of the Law School of Louisiana State
University (LSU).
Hebert, a native Louisianian from Baton Rouge and a graduate
in law from LSU and Yale, was named Dean of Administration of
the University when he was just thirty-two years old. His
appointment was decided following the so-called "Louisiana
Scandals" which rocked the State and even touched the University,

14. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette
Control Council for Germany, 50-55 (1946); M. Cheriff Bassiouni, Crimes
Against Humanity in International Law 3 (2nd rev. ed. Kluwer Law Int'l 1999).
See also Taylor, supranote 9, at 250.
15. See Taylor, supranote 9, at 286.
16. See, e.g., Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany 251 (Doubleday & Co.
1950). See also The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-1949
Vol. 1, 261-62 (Jean E. Smith ed., Indiana Univ. Press 1974) (found in the
Letter from Clay to Echols, Sept. 4, 1946); Taylor, supra note 9, at 34-35;
Benjamin Ferencz's account of the Nuremberg Trials in the Encyclopedia of
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, available at http://www.
benferencz.org/encyclo.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
17. Taylor, supra note 9, at 35. The Farben cause was assigned to the
Tribunal for trial by the "Supervisory Committee of Presiding Judges of the
United States Military tribunals in Germany" on August 12, 1947. Id. at 36.
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Hebert being largely responsible for cleaning up the financial
irregularities at LSU. 8
Since the beginning of the American participation in World
War II, Hebert was engaged in the Industrial Contracts Division of
the Army Judge Advocate General's Corp (JAG). His position
was Chief of the Industrial Law Branch of the JAG's office in
Washington, serving between April 1942 and October 1945. He
obtained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. There, Hebert undertook
several commissions from Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson
and it was probably his work in this office that marked him to be
designated as civilian judge in the subsequent Nuremberg Trials.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of War, his name was
suggested to President Truman.
Hebert and his family left New York on board the USAT
Alexander on July 8, 1947. After their arrival in Germany via
Bremerhaven ten days later, they were redirected to Nuremberg by
train. Like his colleagues in the future Tribunal, the group was
accommodated in Nuremberg's "Grand Hotel" which was being
reconstructed until more suitable accommodations could be
located. Hebert was convinced that he was going to be back in
Louisiana for the second semester of the 1947-1948 academic
year. 19
On August 9, 1947 the American Military Governor in
occupied Germany issued order No. 87 and Military Tribunal No.
VI was finally constituted.20 Curtis Grover Shake, former Justice
of the Supreme Court of Indiana, was appointed as its Presiding
Judge. The court was going to be staffed by him, James Morris,
who was Justice of the Supreme Court of North Dakota, and Dean
Hebert. Clarence F. Merrell, a member of the Indiana bar and a
friend of Shake's, was designated as an alternate Judge.
18. See details in the cover and back pages of The Summer Reveille, June
27, 1939, with photographs. See also Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride: The
American Rehearsal for Dictatorship, 1928-1940, 318 (William Morrow & Co.
1941), and Josiah E. DuBois, The Devil's Chemists: 24 Conspirators of the
International Farben Cartel Who Manufacture Wars 93 (The Beacon Press
1952).
19. Letter from Paul M. Hebert to then LSU President, Harold W. Stokes
(Dec. 3, 1947) (located in Hebert's Personal Files, LSU Archives). Dean Hebert
was delighted with his appointment as he expressed to LSU Dean Fray in the
letter requesting a leave of absence. See Letter from Paul M. Hebert to then
Acting LSU President Fred C. Fray (May 10, 1947) (located in Hebert's
Personal files, LSU Archives).
20. Available in Mazal Library at http://www.mazal.org/archive/nmt/
07/NMT07-T0005.htm (last visited on Nov. 17, 2005).
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B. Bonds with the IMT?
Ordinance No. 7 was issued pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of
the IMT Charter, 2 1 among others, giving to the competent
signatory party the right to bring individuals
to trial before
"national, military, or occupation courts." 22
Additionally, Ordinance No. 7, Art. X provided:
The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in
the judgments in Case No. 1 that invasions, aggressive acts,
aggressive wars, crimes, atrocities or inhuman acts were
planned or occurred, shall be binding on the tribunals
established hereunder and shall not be questioned except
insofar as the participation therein or knowledge thereof by
any particular person may be concerned.23
The binding character of the IMT decision, then, was to the
extent specifically provided in this Ordinance: The indicted facts
existed and such evidence counted as a binding determination for
the rest of the tribunals. 24 Such a rule was probably inspired by
considerations of practical convenience. 25 Albeit, the imperative
ruling in relation to the prior IMT determinations does not mean
26
that the issued verdict, as a whole, must be taken as binding law.
As will be explained later, the IMT decision would exercise
considerable sway in determining the criminal responsibility of the
defendants in the Farbencase with respect to their crimes against
the peace and their conspiracy to perpetrate them.
C. Hitler'sTires and Gas: I.G. Farben
Since 1916, eight of the main German chemical firms were
joined together in what was called "a community of interest""Interessen Gemeinschaften" or abbreviated "I. G. ' 27 This
21. Charter of the International Military Tribunal arts. 10, 11, August 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
22. Control Council Law No. 10, supranote 14.
23. Taylor, supra note 9, at 289.
24. Id. at 290.
25. Maximilian Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39
Geo.L. J. 18, 33 (1950).
26. Taylor, supranote 9, at 290.
27. They were B.A.S.F. or "Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik,"
"Farbenfabriken" (former F. Bayer & Co.), "Farbwerke" (formerly "Meister
Lucius & Bruenin" from "Hoechst"), "A.G.F.A." or "Aktien-Gesellschaft fuer
Anilin-Fabrikation," "Chemische Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron," "Chemische
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conglomerate had nearly a total monopoly of German chemical
production at the beginning of World War II and, undoubtedly,
was one of the main cartels in the world. Its controlling boards
rested in the hands of a Surveillance Council, Aufsichtsrat, and in
the hands of a Board of Directors, Vorstand, as was required by
German corporate law.2 8 The former supervised, at least formally,
the overall management of the conglomerate through reports from
the Vorstand, which was in charge of the daily work of the cartel.
The chairman of the Board since 1935 was Hermann Schmitz and
the group's most important plants were managed directly by one or
more members of the Board. After 1937 the Vorstand was built up
to twenty-seven members who met monthly and decided issues,
according to the conglomerate's bylaws, such as the selling or
reduction of plants, the purchase or sale of patents, and the
manufacturing or selling in the facilities within the German Empire
and abroad. Farben was a unique concern with authentic economic
and scientific power, being responsible for more than half of all
German industrial chemical exports for most of the prewar
period.2 9
In spite of a clear anti-Nazi position at the time Hitler rose to
power, when the movement to war was defined, Farben converted
itself into one of Hitler's most powerful allies as the fueling
impulse of the German war machine. The Farben group was proud
of producing an uninterrupted stream of scientific discoveries and
inventions. Perhaps the most impressive of them all was the ability
to produce synthetic rubber and gasoline from coal-products
essential to the German war plan. Some authors presumed that
Hitler
without Farben's immense productivity and experience,
3
would not have been in a position to start World War I. 0

Fabriken" (former "Weiler-ter Meer"), "L.Cassella & Co. GmbH" and "Kelle &
Co. AG."
28. See Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] [Commercial Code] Jan. 30, 1937, §§
231, 243 and German Law on Joint Stock Corporations, Jan. 30, 1937, available
in 6 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 393-400. The English version of
the IG Farben's bylaws are in 7 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 386-

88.
29. See Raymond G. Stokes, Divide and Prosper: The Heirs of I.G. Farben
Under Allied Authority, 1945-1951 xii (Univ. of Cal. Press 1988). For the story
of the group, see Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben
(Free Press 1978).
30. U.S. Group Council, Finance Division, Germany, Report on
Investigation of 1G. Farbenindustrie,Sept. 12, 1945, cited in Borkin, supra note
29, at 1n. 1; see also Stokes, supra note 29, at 44.
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During the war, to resolve the problem of a shortage of
workers, hundreds of thousands of forced and slave workers were
forcefully displaced and transported by the Nazis to production
facilities in Germany and the occupied territories. According to
the figures of the indictment, by 1941, Farben had assigned to its
plants 10,000 slave workers. This number doubled in 1942,
reaching 58,000 in 1943, 85,000 in 1944, and more than 100,000
by 1945. 31
1. Auschwitz
Farben's participation in Auschwitz began as early as 1940
when the concern decided to build a major factory designed to
cover the production of synthetic gasoline and rubber. The new
factory was to be built in the occupied East territories with an
investment of, at the time, a quarter of a billion dollars. The place
selected for the construction was Auschwitz and the project was
approved on April 25, 1941 by the entire Board.32
During the construction of the first Farben plant in Auschwitz,
Himmler visited the construction site and ordered that it be given
priority over all other industrial organizations in the region. But a
practical question interfered with the quick finalization of the
project: the number of prisoners used in the construction could not
be increased, presumedly due to the lack of a completed fence and
the distance between33the place where the prisoners were lodged
and the Farben plant.
2. Monowitz
The problem was solved when Farben decided to build a new
concentration camp beside the plant in construction. This camp
has been called "Auschwitz III," "Auschwitz-Buna," "Buna" or
"Monowitz." Different sources estimate that more than 25,000
slave workers paid with their lives during the erection of the plant.
Among the inmates of Monowitz was the future Nobel Peace Prize
recipient Elie Wiesel who wrote: "The prisoners all agreed, saying
'Buna's a very good camp. You can stand it. The important thing
is not to get transferred
34 to the building unit. . . ' As if the choice
were in our hands."'
31.
32.
33.
34.
Wang

7 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 192.
Id. at 195.
8 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1184.
Elie Wiesel, The Night Trilogy: Night, Dawn, the Accident 56 (Hill and
1985).
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Monowitz was surrounded with electrically charged barbed
wire fence, watchtowers, and guards provided by the SS. The life
span of an inmate coming to Monowitz was approximately three to
four months. Exhaustion, malnutrition, freezing in winter, and
beatings were the main causes of death.35
II. THE CASE IN NUREMBERG

The Farbencase opened on August 14, 1947. It was handled
in the Justiz Palastin the FurtherStrasse, in the same courtroom
where a few months earlier the IMT took place. The proceedings
were conducted by simultaneous translation in English and
German, electronically recorded, and stenographically reported.
Sixty lawyers, numerous accountants, and specialists looked after
the defendants. The courtroom was totally filled for the trial's
beginning. The opening statement for the Prosecution was given
by Telford Taylor. The indictment in the case was directed to all
living persons who were members of the Board after 1937. At the
time of the trial, however, a member who was retired in 1943 with
very precarious health was dismissed, remaining therefore were
twenty-three defendants. 36
Four defendants who were not
members of the Board were indicted, two of them as leading
political agents, one as member of Farben's Commercial
Committee, and the last one because of his position as director and
construction manager of several of the conglomerate's plants in
Auschwitz.
All of the defendants were indicted for the planning,
preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, and
invasions of other countries (count one); plunder and spoliation
(count two); slavery and mass murder (count three); and common
plan of conspiracy (count five). All of the defendants, with one
exception, were members of the German Labor Front, most of
them belonged to the Nazi Party, and three were additionally
indicted for membership in the SS (count four).3 7

35. Borkin, supra note 29, at 120.
36. They were Carl Krauch, Hermann Schmitz, Georg von Schnitzler, Fritz
Gajewski, Heinrich Horlein, August von Knierem, Fritz ter Meer, Christian
Schneider, Otto Ambros, Max Briiggemann, Ernst Birgin, Heinrich Buitefisch,
Paul Hifflinger, Max ligner, Friedrich Jhne, Hans Kihne, Karl Lautenschlager,
Wilhelm Mann, Heinrich Oster, Karl Wdrster, Walter Dnirrfeld, Heinrich
Gattineau, Erich von der Heyde, and Hans Kugler. 7 Trials of War Criminals,
supranote 6, at 11-14.
37. Defendants Schneider, Buitefisch, and von der Heyde.
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The case ended on May 12, 1948, after fifteen months where
one hundred and fifty two trial days demanded nearly sixteen
thousand pages of transcription compiled in sixty-four volumes
excluding the concurring and dissenting opinions filed by Judge
Hebert.
A. Crimes Against Peace
The Prosecution in the Farben case was confronted not just
with the considerable difficulty of establishing beyond doubt that
the defendants necessarily knew of the rearmament of Germany,
but also that the purpose of this rearmament was to wage
aggressive wars.
The defense uniformly sustained that the evidence relating to
I.G. Farben's role in military war preparations failed to show that
the defendants' had the special knowledge, required by the IMT, of
Hitler's secret aggressive plans. The defendants further maintained
that the evidence did not demonstrate their direct participation in
these plans. The Tribunal seemed to accept this reasoning.
The Tribunal understood that, by necessity, the great majority
of the population supported the German war effort to some degree.
Therefore, some reasonable standard was necessary to determine
what degree of participation or support would constitute a crime.
In the opinion of the court, the IMT had already fixed such a
standard for those who lead Germany into war. On the other hand,
none of the defendants could be included in such a high, leading
group. In the Tribunal's opinion, a lower standard would lead to a
determination of collective guilt with the corollary of mass
punishment for which there was no precedent or justification. The
Tribunal found that none of the defendants were guilty8 of the
crimes set forth in counts one and five and acquitted them.

38. Defendants Schneider, Bfitefisch, and von der Heyde were additionally
charged with membership in the SS, an organization responsible for guarding
and administering the concentration camps, and one already declared criminal
by the IMT. The Prosecution in the Farben case was convinced that it was
unnecessary to discuss that intelligent persons, who had been members of the SS
for a long period of time, may invoke ignorance about the fact that the
organization was used for the commission of crimes against humanity.
Although, in the opinion of the court, such a presumption was incorrect if the
Prosecution attempted to use it in order to shift the burden of proof to the
defendants. According to the majority, the records showed that the membership
of the mentioned defendants was casual, innocuous or inconsistent, and,
therefore, did not establish the requisite level of guilt.
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The use of the doctrine of conspiracy was already criticized at
the IMT. It stated that conspiracy had no basis in international
law, and since the doctrine required no proof of individual criminal
intent beyond the act of association, the potential for abuse was
great.3 9 Justice Jackson himself, after returning to the U.S.
Supreme Court bench, recognized that "[t]he modern
40 crime of
conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition.
However imperfectly Jackson understood this crime at his
return, he was the driving force for laying down in the Nuremberg
Charter the crime of aggression and conspiracy to commit it. He
carried out a plan originated in the War Department by Secretary
Stimson: if a person plans aggression when aggression has been
renounced by his nation, then he is a crimina. 1 According to
Jackson's biographer, he saw it as his "duty" to codify in the
Charter what he understood was existing international law43at the
time. 42 This view deserved several well-justified criticisms.
Judge Hebert explained at the end of the reading, in a separate
statement, that in spite of concurring in the result, the judgment
contains many statements with which he did not agee and he
reserved the right to file a separate concurring opinion.4
B. Plunderand Spoliation
Among the crimes included in the charges were plunder,
exploitation, spoliation, and other offenses against property in the
occupied territories.
The Tribunal adopted the interpretation
39. Jeffrey D. Hockett, Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Supreme Court, and
the Nuremberg Trial, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 257, 269; Franz Neumann, The War
Crimes Trials,2 World Politics 135, 139 (1949).
40. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446, 69 S. Ct. 716, 720
(1949). Jackson recognized that, as it happened with the German tradition,
"[Tihe doctrine does not commend itself to jurists of civil law countries." Id. at
450, 69 S. Ct. at 721.
41. See Robert H. Jackson, The Significance of the Nuremberg Trials to the
Armed Forces, 10 Mil. Aff. 2, 4 (1946); Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg
Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 Foreign Aff. 179, 181-84 (1947); Bernard D.
Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg's Architect and Advocate, 68 Alb. L.
Rev. 55, 57 (2004); Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg 33-36
(Basic Books 1977).
42. Eugene C. Gerhart, America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson 333-44
(Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1958). See also Jackson's letter to Gerhart (Mar. 17, 1949)
at 446.
43. Hockett, supranote 39, at 267.
44. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1204.
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45
prepared by another Tribunal in the so-called Flick Case.
According to this case, the crime was relevant only against the
person and not the property. Consequently, the particulars of
plunder, exploitation, and spoliation were considered only as
charged when alleging the commission of war crimes.
The Tribunal stated that the applicable law for plunder and
spoliation was the pertinent part of CCL 10, Article II, 1, b) which
These
corresponds with Art. 6, sect. (b) of the IMT's Charter.
criminal offenses were also recognized as war crimes under
international law prior to the IMT Charter and codified in the
Hague's Regulations. 47 The Tribunal established that these war
crimes were committed through Farben with respect to properties
located in Poland,48 Norway,4 France,50 and Russia.5 1

C. Slave Labor
Under count three, the Prosecution charged the defendants,
collectively, individually, and acting through Farben of:
participating in the enslavement and deportation of slave labor of
the civilian population to territories under German occupation, the
enslavement of concentration camp inmates, and the use of
prisoners of war in operations directly related to war efforts. 52 It
was further alleged that the enslaved persons were mistreated,
terrorized, tortured, and murdered. 53 This accusation had special
significance considering the deep implication of Farben in the
Auschwitz concentration camp.

45. 6 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 1187-1222 (Case No. 5: U.
S. v. Friedrich Flick et al.).
46. See sources cited supranote 14.
47. See sources cited supranote 1.
48. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 1141.
49. Id. at 1144.
50. Id. at 1146.
51. Id. at 1152. Concerning the responsibility of the defendants, Schmitz as
chairman of the Vorstand, was found guilty of expressly or impliedly
authorizing and improving the spoliation program in the French dyestuff
industry and in Norway. Id. at 1156-57, 1159-65, and 1167. Von Schnitzler
was found guilty in relation with Poland and France like Ter Meer who was,
additionally, found guilty in relation with the Russian industry. BUrgin in
relation with Poland, Hifflinger and Ilgner with Norway, Jahne, Oster and
Kugler were also found guilty under this charge.
52. 7 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 50.
53. Id.at 51.
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The Prosecution gave special attention to some of the conduct
considered at the judgment:
a. Poison Gas: The Zyklon B used in the gas chambers to
exterminate human beings was manufactured by one firm
belonging mainly to the IG Farben conglomerate.
However, the majority of the Tribunal concluded that the
evidence fell short of establishing the guilt of the Farben
board or its members, as having persuasive influence in this
firm or any significant knowledge
of the uses to which its
54
production was being put.
b. Medical Experiments: The Prosecution asserted that
some of the defendants participated knowingly in the
supply of Farben vaccines and drugs to the SS for the
purpose of testing them on camp inmates. The majority
could not overcome a reasonable doubt that any of the
accused defendants were principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted, or took
55 a consenting part in the
commission of said crimes.
c. Slave-Labor Program: The Prosecution affirmed that
the defendants, through Farben, embraced, adopted, and
executed the forced-labor policies of the Third Reich. The
majority understood that during the course of war all the
main Farben plants suffered serious labor depletion yet
were charged with meeting fixed production quotas.
Farben yielded to the pressure of the Reich Labor Office
and accepted forced labor in its plants. The defendants
maintained that utilization of slave labor was the necessary
result of compulsory production quotas imposed upon them
by the Nazi Government. The majority of the Tribunal
accepted this argument of necessity, finding credible
evidence that in case of a refusal to reach the set quota,
Hitler would have profited from the opportunity to make an
example out of a Farben leader. The Tribunal reviewed the
IMT, the Flick and the Rchling56 cases and considered that
a superior order or a law or governmental decree would not
justify the defense of necessity, unless one is deprived of a

54. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 1168.
55. Id. at 1169.
56. 14 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1061-1143 (The case of
Hermann Rochling, the indictment, judgment, and judgment on appeal in the
Rochling case are reproduced as Appendix B).
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and forced to take a different course of
moral 5choice
7
action.
During the trial, a considerable quantity of documents was
produced, which proved beyond any doubt the knowledge of the
Vorstand concerning the use of slave labor in their plants. It
should be recalled that the group of defendants was highly
cultured, socially-bonded, and strongly linked with the highest
level of decision-making-a true scientific and managerial
aristocracy. It is difficult to believe the often invoked "different
worlds," 5 defense of the Vorstand, considering the stench of the
crematorium furnaces working twenty-four hours a day. The
Tribunal, however, was reluctant to attribute knowledge to the
defendants without concrete proof of a direct
59 engagement in any of
the behaviors contemplated in the counts.

57. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1179. Therefore, the Court
looked into the conduct of the three Farben officials most directly responsible
for the construction at Auschwitz. They were Ambros, Buitefisch, and Doirrfeld.
Id. at 1180. Ambros was the technical expert with the Buna rubber plant, and
Diirrfeld worked directly in Auschwitz reporting to the camp commander H6ss,
and Bitefisch, in addition to having other direct responsibilities, was chairman
of the Fiirstengrubewhere Polish inmates were forced to work in the mines
Id. at 1089-90.
extracting coal which was directly used by Farben.
Additionally, Krauch, as Plenipotentiary General for Special Question of
Chemical Production, dealt directly with the distribution of labor to Auschwitz
in a manner negating his claim of a lack of knowledge of the employment of
concentration camp-inmates. Id. at 1187. The same conclusion was reached
regarding Ter Meer. Id. at 1189-93. Besides these convictions, the majority of
the Tribunal could not rule out the defense of necessity as applicable to the rest
of the defendants who were members of the Vorstand and plant leaders at that
time. Id. at 1193.
58. Id. at 1076. Final Statement of Defendant Dtlrrfeld:
The concentration camp and IG have been two entirely different spheres,
two different spiritual worlds, outwardly and manifestly they are joined by
the same name, but there is a deep abyss between the two. Over there you
have the concentration camp; here you have the IG plant .... There orders
of lunacy; here you have creative achievement. Over there you find
hopelessness; here you find the boldest hopes. Over there you find
degradation and humiliation; over here you find concern for the individual
man. Over there you find death, and over here you encounter life.
Id.
59. Lippman, supra note 7, at 88; see generally 8 Trials of War Criminals,
supranote 6, at 1180-96. According to the Prosecution, during the existence of
the concentration camp, defendant Ambros had visited the place eighteen times,
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Nevertheless, the Tribunal convicted defendants Ambros,
Bitefisch, Diirrfeld, Krauch, and Ter Meer under this count,
principally for the initiative shown in the procurement of slave
labor in the construction of Farben's Buna plant at Auschwitz. The
eighteen remaining defendants were all acquitted, fifteen of whom
were members of the Vorstand. The majority of the Tribunal
conceded that slave labor was employed and utilized with the
defendant's knowledge and on a wide scale throughout the
numerous plants of the Farben organization. However, except in
the case of Auschwitz, no criminal responsibility resulted from
participation in the utilization of slave labor.
Judge Hebert expressed his dissent with this part of the
decision in a two-page, typed paper which was attached to it. His
primary disagreement was with the recognition of the "defense of
necessity" as applied to the facts proven in this case. In his
opinion, all members of the Vorstand willingly cooperated in the
slave labor program-including the utilization of forced workers,
prisoners of war, and concentration camp inmates. He could not
convince himself that persons in a position of power and influence
like that of the defendants had no knowledge of such a program.
His dissenting opinion will be separately considered in this paper.
1I.

THE VERDICT

The day when the reading of the verdict began, a devastating
explosion blasted I. G. Farben's main plant in Ludwigshafen, near
Frankfurt, in the French occupation zone of Germany. The
explosion killed more than three hundred people and injured
thousands. 60 The origin of the explosion was never conclusively
explained. According to the transcripts, prior to the start of the
reading of the verdict, the assemblage rose in silent tribute to the
victims of the blast. The court was then 61
thanked by the counsel of
defendant Schmitz for this act of respect.

Bitefisch visited on seven occasions, and Durrfeld lived on the site. Other
members of the Vorstand visited the place one or two times.
60. Richard O'Regan, Farben Explosion Kills 300 to 800; 6200 Hurt,
Wash. Post, July 29, 1948, at 1 (The cover page of "The Washington Post"
newspaper of July 29, 1948 showed a photograph of the shattered Farben plant
in fumes with the title, "6200 Hurt in Disaster; Flames Shoot Miles High; New
Explosions Shatter Wrecked Buildings Where 22,000 Worked; 500-800 Are
Killed in Farben Plant Explosion.").
61. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 1081.
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The judgment was read by all members of the Tribunal
alternatively, on three days spanning July 29, 30, and 31. On the
last day, thirteen Farben officials were sentenced, but Hebert's
protest of the acquittals of a number of defendants was noted on
the front page of the New York Times. 62 Despite initially
opposing the majority in relation to the first count of waging a war
of aggression, Hebert had a change of heart. Until nearly the day
before the reading of the judgment, he was planning to dissent also
on count one. 63 However, he finally served notice that he would
enter a dissenting opinion only with respect to count three. On that
charge, related to the use of slave labor, he maintained that the
evidence presented by the Prosecution justified a guilty verdict for
all but three defendants who were
64 not members of the board of
directors at the time of the crimes.
Despite a public allegation that the rest of the Tribunal-Shake
and Morris-were sympathetic to the defense, the point was never
proved.65 When the verdict was finally delivered, ten of the
twenty-three defendants were acquitted of all charges. All were
also acquitted from counts one and five. Even those that were
prosecuted for being members of the SS were absolved.66
DuBois, as a member of the Prosecution, was indignant. He
characterized the sentences as "light enough to please a chicken
67
thief, or a driver who had irresponsibly run down a pedestrian."

62. Kathleen McLaughlin, 13 Farben Aides Sentenced; Judge Protests
Acquittals; Jailedfor War Crimes 13 FarbenLeaders Get Up to 8 Years, N.Y.
Times, July 31, 1948, at 1.
63. See Dubois, supranote 18, at 346.
64. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1307.
65. John Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes 180
(Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1954) (citing transcript 15-685-9).
66. Krauch was declared guilty of the charge of spoliation and sentenced to
six years in prison. Schmitz was found guilty of count two and condemned to
four years. Von Schnitzler was condemned to five years for the same count.
Ter Meer was guilty under counts two and three and was condemned to seven
years in jail. Ambros and Ddrrfeld were declared guilty under count three and
each was condemned to eight years. BUrgin and Osterflinger were each found
guilty under count two and condemned to two years. Btitefisch, guilty under
count three, was sentenced to six years. Ilgner was found guilty on count two
and received a sentence of three years in prison. Kiugler and Jaihne were both
convicted under count two and sentenced to one and a half years in prison
(which had already passed in the case of Kiigler). 8 Trials of War Criminals,
supranote 6, at 1206-09. In 1950, all convicted defendants were free.
67. DuBois, supranote 18, at 339; see also Stokes, supranote 29, at 156.
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Some German authors highly encouraged the reading of the
decision. 68 Hellmuth Dix, who then was the counsel for defendant
Christian Schneider and was later the attorney for the group in
further claims, published an article shortly after the judgment in a
well-known German legal journal affirming: "So through this
proceeding was demolished the myth of the concurring guilt in
starting the war and its unhuman consequences by the German
Industry and its most important representatives
leaving the way
69
free for a peaceful reconstruction.'
After the reading of the judgment, the Tribunal adjourned and
some days later its members returned to their homes embarking on
the ship General Patrick. Hebert's dissenting opinion would be
drafted at home in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
A. Conspiracyof Predators
Hebert's decision to issue a dissenting opinion in the Farben
case was seen as a withering blast to the rest of the Tribunal's
members.70 However, he assumed that his disagreement with the
majority's conclusion was not unexpected. 7 '
DuBois, who shared a cabin with Hebert aboard the General
Patrick,wrote:
One of the lawyers who has worked as advisor to the
Tribunal had told me that, up until nearly the last day,
Hebert had been writing a dissent on the aggressive-war
count, holding that Krauch and some of the others were
guilty. After an awful struggle of conscience, he had
decided to go alone with Shake and Morris on that count.
68. Herbert Thiele-Fredesdorf, Das Urteilim I. G. Farben-Prozess,10 Neue
Juristiche Wochenschrift 376-77 (1949).
69. Hellmuth Dix, Die Urteile in den Niirnberger Witschafprozessen, 17
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 6, 647, 652 (1949), reprinted in E. Benton &
Georg Grimm, Nuremberg-German Views of the War Trials 160-176 (SMU
Press 1955) (English translation).
70. Robert Conot, Justice at Nuremberg 517 (Harper & Row 1983);
Maguire, supranote 9, at 188-90; Borkin, supra note 29, at 155; Frank Buscher,
The U.S. War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1946-1955, 36 (Greenwood
Press 1989); see also Benjamin Ferencz, Less Than Slaves 35 (Harvard 1979);
Cecilia Goetz, The Fifth Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium: 1945-1995:
CriticalPerspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability, Panel
1, 12 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 453, 521 (1995).
71. Archive of Jottings by Paul M. Hebert, available at
http://louisdl.louislibraries.org/HNF/Pages/home.php (last visited November 8,
2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Archives].
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It was clear now that, from the first, the court had been split
in two, with Morris72and Shake on one side, Hebert and
Merrell on the other.
Albeit, DuBois was wrong in relation to Hebert's struggle of
conscience. The reasons for Hebert's change of mind, as he
showed in his notes, was determined by three factors: a deeper
analysis of the IMT precedent in relation to Speer and Schacht, the
implications of the French Zone Tribunal decision against
R6chlin4, and an article in a law journal related to the IMT
verdict.
I formerly proceeded upon the theory that there was no
difference between count 5 (conspiracy) and Count 1.
There is a marked difference. Under count five if the
defendants participated with knowledge in a common plan
to commit crimes against peace, i.e., to initiate or wage
aggressive wars, there can be a conviction without the
of specific plans for
necessity of proving knowledge
74
times.
specific
at
wars
specific
The major controversial issue in Hebert's view was the
question of war guilt or crimes against peace. 75 "The query which
I have to answer to the satisfaction of my conscience . . . is
whether any of the defendants fairly come with the group of 76those
bearing a major share of the responsibility for World War U.,,
He understood that waging aggressive war was a concept
where mass guilt might be implied and he recognized the difficulty
of demarcating
a clear line between who was guilty and who was
77
innocent.
The acquittal by the IMT of Schacht and Speer of the charges
of crimes against peace were weifhty precedents which had
necessarily affected the Farbencase. The judges of the IMT trial
somehow accepted the naive alibi that these defendants, who were
among Hitler's main partners in waging war, did not really know
72. DuBois, supranote 18, at 346-47.
73. Hebert's notes frequently quoted, Harold Leventhal et al., The
Nuerenberg Verdict, 60 Harv. L. Rev 857, 857-906 (1947), referring to the
article as the "Harvard article."
74. Archives, supra note 71.
75. Paul M. Hebert., The Nuremberg Subsequent Trials, The Louisiana Bar
Journal, April 1949, at 8.
76. Archives, supra note 71.
77. Hebert, supra note 75, at 18.
78. See cases cited supra note 6.
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that the rearmament was intended for aggressive war. Hebert
wrote:
As a matter of basic philosophy I do not favor a strict
interpretation of the IMT judgment, and feel that, as no
industrialist who participated in the rearmament effort of
Germany was before the Tribunal in that case, the whole
criminal responsibility of the defendants is res novae. In
my own mind I am convinced that, if one of the principal
defendants in this case had been before the IMT on the
record such as we have there would have been a finding of
guilty.7 9

The undisputable point attached to the dictum of the IMT was
that, if the main Directors of the rearmament program-Speer and
Schacht-were acquitted, how could a charge be sustained against
Schmitz and the rest of the I. G. Farben board? It is correct to
assume that to prosecute Farben's directors with such a precedent
was futile from the beginning.
The acquittal of the leading officials of the Krupp firm, whose
verdict was known only the day after finishing the Farben case,
was also understood as a strong precedent in Hebert's research
while drafting his separate opinions.80 The acquittal in the French
Zone of officials of the R6chling firm also weighed in his
considerations. Such precedents, coupled with a most liberal
application of the rule of "reasonable doubt" in favor of the
defendants, resulted in his reluctance to draw inferences
unfavorable to the defendants on these counts.
79. Archives, supra note 71.
80. See generally 9 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6. Judge Anderson,
President of the Tribunal in the "Krupp Case," thought that liability for planning
aggressive war should be limited to the leaders who did the planning and not
civilians who were not policy-makers. He wrote:
The requisite knowledge, I think, can be shown either by direct or
circumstantial evidence but in any case it must be knowledge of facts
and circumstances which would enable the particular individual to
determine not only that there was a concrete plan to initiate and wage
war, but that the contemplated conflict would be a war of aggression
and hence criminal. Such knowledge being shown, it must be further
established that the accused participated in the plan with the felonious
intent to aid in the accomplishment of the criminal objective. In the
individual crime of aggressive war or conspiracy to that end as
contradistinguished to the international delinquency of a state in
resorting to hostilities, the individual intention is of major importance.
Id. at 436.
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However, in his view, the vast volume of credible evidence
which the Prosecution presented to the Tribunal made him disagree
with the majority conclusion that the evidence presented in the
case was insufficient. 81 He truly believed that the defendants
indeed knew that they were preparing all their production for a
possible war. He understood as certain that their actions were not
just the normal activities of businessmen. Farben, under the
leadership of the defendants, pursued a course of action which
should be understood as adverse to the cause of international peace
in numerous respects. 82 In spite of this behavior, the proof
produced in the case did not meet the extraordinary
standard
83
required by the precedents for a guilty conviction.
In the separate concurring opinion on this point, he affirmed
that in spite of the violent Nazi regime, nothing deterred the top
leadership of the Farben corporation from supporting it. Albeit, in
order to bring the participants within the frame of the required
accountability, Hebert recognized that their participation must have
been substantial and accompanied by the requisite criminal state of
mind.
I conclude that, however desirable such a legal conception
of the requisite of knowledge might be as a matter of policy
in international law, the proposition advanced in this
definition of state of mind is too broad and goes beyond the
provisions of Control Council Law No. 10. ° 4
The required participation must have been with the concrete
plan to wage an aggressive war, though not necessarily against a
certain country or at a certain time.
In the case of the Farben defendants, while they know that
acts of aggression had been and were being carried out in
connection with Austria and Czechoslovakia, and, in fact,
the defendants participate in acquiring industries resulting
from the acts of aggression mentioned, it cannot be
concluded that such action necessarily amounts to the
requisite knowledge 8or5 state of mind constituting plans to
wage aggressive war.
It was impossible to determine when, if ever, the defendants
agreed to join an enterprise constituting crimes against peace or
81. 8 Trial of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1308.
82. Id. at 1302, 1303
83. Id. at 1304.
84. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 1302.
85. Id. at 1303.
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joined such an alleged conspiracy. Likewise, Hebert refused to
accept the position that the defendants participated in the common
plan for the initiation of wars of aggression, as defined and limited
by the judgment of the IMT.
The conflict shown by the swinging back and forth position in
relation to the crime of aggression and its conspiracy anticipated a
problem which would be seen in the following decades. The
concept of aggression is one of the most critical, elusive, and
vague locutions in international law, a problem not resolved at the
United Nations 86 and not resolved during by the Rome Conference
87
in preparing the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
B. Hebert'sLonely Voice: Farben'sDirectorsandSlave Labor
In Hebert's opinion, Farben accepted and willingly utilized
slave labor. Hebert concurred with the conviction of the five
defendants, but he was of the opinion that their criminal
responsibility went much further than merely embracing those
connected with the Auschwitz plant.
In my view, all the members of the Farben Vorstand should
be held guilty under Count Three of the indictment not only
for the participation by Farben in the crime of enslavement
at Auschwitz, but also for Farben's widespread
participation and willing cooperation 88with the slave labor
system in the other Farben plants ....
It should be noted that governmental compulsion was merely a
matter to be considered as mitigation of guilt.89 In the Farben
case, the evidence showed no credible proof that any of the
defendants were opposed to the use of slave laborers. On the
contrary, the record showed that Farben willingly cooperated and
gladly utilized each new source of manpower as it developed. 0
According to Hebert:
86. See Julius Stone, Conflict Through Consensus (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 1977); Gert Meier, Der Begriff des bewaffneten Angriffs, 24 Archiv des
Volkerechts 173, 182 (1986) (criticizing the lack of an accurate definition
obtained by the U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) "Definition of Aggression").
87. The magnitude of its conflictive understanding is conspicuous in the
recent compromise expressed by the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Rome
Statute and in the postponement of resolving the matter presumedly until 2009.
See Rome Statute, supranote 8.
88. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 1308.
89. See Control Council Law No. 10, supranote 14, Art. II, § 4(b).
90. See 8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6.
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I cannot agree that there was an absence of a moral
choice. In utilizing slave labor within Farben the will of
the actors coincided with the will of those controlling the
Government and who had directed or ordered the doing of
criminal acts .... 91

Hebert stated that accepting the defense of necessity would
have led to the conclusion that Hitler alone was responsible for the
major war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during
the Nazi regime.
Such doctrine constitutes, in my opinion, unbridled license
for the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity on the broadest possible scale through the simple
expediency of the issuance of compulsory governmental
regulations combined with the terrorism of the totalitarian
police state. The essence of a truly effective system of
international penal law lies in its applicability to the acts of
individuals who are not privileged to disregard the
overriding commands of international law when they come
in conflict with the contrary policies or directives of a State
not 9desiring
to abide by the principles of international
2
law.
The use of such a defense would mean that unless a defendant
exercised unusual initiative to bring about participation in the
utilization of slave labor or showed an initiative going beyond the
requirements of the cruel regulations, no crime was committed.
Farben's complete integration into the war machinery was not
considered by the majority as "exercising initiative." 93 Even
putting the workers behind barbed wire fences or erecting a
disciplinary camp at the Farben plant were actions protected by
this interpretation of "necessity." 9 Hebert thought that the defense
that the plans concerning the Auschwitz Buna Plant were unknown
to all members of the Vorstandwas unacceptable.
I find it hard to understand why the majority can conclude
that construction and production at Auschwitz was not
under Reich compulsion when the Reich wanted the plant
for war production and directed its erection, and production
involving utilization of slave labor in other plants was
91. Id. at 1309.
92. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1310; see also Goetz, supra
note 70, at 525.
93. 8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 1319 et seq.
94. Id. at 1323.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

518

[Vol. 66

"under compulsion." The answer, it seems to me, lies in
the fact that the freedom was as real in all the Farben plants
and the similar attitude of willing cooperation was
present-differing at Auschwitz only in the matter of
degree.95
He found that the criminal intent required as a prerequisite to
guilt under the charge of war crimes and crimes against humanity
was present if the corporate officer knowingly authorized the
participation of the corporation in an action of a criminal
character. 96 From the outset of the Buna Project it was known that
slave labor from the concentration camp was going to be the
principal source of labor for the project. Utilization of such labor
was approved as a matter of corporate policy. 97 He concluded that
all the members of the Vorstand viewed the availability of such
labor and its subsequent employment at Auschwitz as an
"assistance" to Farben and, accordingly, all defendants should
98
share in the responsibility for its utilization.
The evidence established that the conditions at Auschwitz were
inhuman to an extreme degree. It was cited as credible evidence
the testimony of a number of British prisoners who spoke about
inmate conditions.99 Perhaps, as Speer contended in the IMT
decision, the defendants were not directly concerned with cruelty
in the administration of the slave labor program; but certainly as it
happened with Speer, they were perfectly aware of its existence
and they profited from the total disregard of any moral or legal
consideration. "I am of the opinion that each defendant who is a
member of the Vorstand should be held guilty under count three of
the indictment ....100
Hebert's position on this crime went alone as dissidence. An
aura of impunity pervaded the judgment of the case.
C. American Leniency Against Industrialists
After returning from Nuremberg, Hebert reaffirmed the
importance of the trials. He felt that they constituted a relevant
part of the background considered in any movement, similar to the
movement started at that time by the United Nations Organization
95.

Id. at 1313.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1320.

100. Id. at 1325.
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for the future codification of international law. He was convinced
work would eventually lead to an international
that such important
01
criminal code. 1
By 1947, some of the most prominent American jurists were
beginning to turn against the war tribunals. For many of them, the
menace presented by the Soviets blurred the inhumanities shown
during the court sessions. A Congressman, with clear anti-Semitic
tones, attacked the Nuremberg trials in the House of
Representatives saying: "[A] racial minority, two and a half years
after the war closed, are in Nuremberg not only hanging German
trying German businessmen in the name of the United
soldiers 0but
2
States.'

Among the critics of the U.S. war crimes punishment program
were even members of the judiciary. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone described the Nuremberg trials as a "high grade lynching
party. ' 103 Justice William 0. Douglas believed that the guilt of the
Nazi leaders "did not justify us in substituting power for
principle. ' 1°4 Former judge Charles Wennerstrum, an Iowa
Supreme Court justice who served as presiding judge in the
Nuremberg Hostages case, 10 5 noted that, "If I had known seven
16
months ago what I know today, I would never have come here."' 0
Taylor questioned Wennerstrum's statements, but the damage
was already done. 10 7 DuBois recalls that the War Department did
not support charging the industrialists because it in no way wanted
101. The Daily Reveille, Sept. 17, 1948, at 4C. See also Paul M. Hebert, The
Nuremberg Subsequent Trials, 16 Ins. Councel J. 226, 231 (1949):
It is certain that the twelve judgements rendered in the Nurnberg
subsequent proceedings will have an important bearing upon the future
development of international penal law. The trials served to focus
attention upon shortcomings of existing international law and a body of
valuable materials has been collected for the codifier of the future. A
by-product should be a strengthening of a world conception of law and
the erection of legal standards to which the civilized nations of the
world may adhere.
102. Conot, supra note 70, at 517.
103. Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 716 (Viking
1956).
104. William 0. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty 96 (Doubleday 1954).
105. U.S. v. List et al. (Case No. 7), 11 Trials of War Criminals, supra note
6.
106. Hal Foust, Nazi Trial Judge Rips "Injustice," Chi. Trib., Feb. 23, 1948,
at 1.
107. ProsecutorScores War-Crimes Judge, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1948, at 5
See Buscher, supra note 70, at 35.
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to discourage the American industrialists from supplying U.S.
troops with war material for fear of having these kinds of charges
brought against them in future conflicts.10 8
Another scholar
presumed that the lenient punishment given to the industrialists fit
with the American judicial tradition of giving light sentences for
white-collar crime.
Buscher affirms that by the end of the 1940s:
[M]any in the United States had accepted that the convicted
Nazi perpetrators were not criminals, but were instead the
victims of the Allied war crimes program. This attitude,
which played greatly into the hands of the German anti-trial
lobby, further lessened the commitment of U.S. authorities
to carry out the program as originally intended." 0
William Caming, who was Chief Prosecutor in the Ministries
Case No. 11,11 recalled how global politics hit Nuremberg like an
artillery shell: "We had visits from congressmen and senators who
favored the re-armament of Germany and who said
12 that we had to
get rid of the trials because they're an obstacle."'
In the fall of 1947, visitors from the U.S. Congress joined the
chorus against the de-Nazification program and the House Select
Committee on Foreign Aid in its Final Report recommended that it
should be ended by May 1948.113 Representatives Taft (R-Ohio),
Case (R-South Dakota), Dondero (R-Michigan), Knutson (RMinnesota), and Taber (R-New York) harshly criticized the U.S.
for continuing the prosecution of Germans when the other Allies
had stopped.

108. Dubois, supranote 18, at 21-22.
109. Stokes, supranote 29, at 153.
110. Buscher, supra note 70, at 37.
111. U.S. v. Von Weizsaecker et al. (Case No. 11), in 12-14 Trials of War
Criminals, supranote 6.
112. General Clark received a letter from a colleague who considered the
IMT subsequent Tribunals as part of a "scheme designated to strip the financier
and industrialists of Germany of their wealth and to destroy German capitalism."
See American Radio Works, The Legacy of Nuremberg, July 2002,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/j usticeontrial/nurembergl.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
113. John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the
Military, 1945-1949, 171 (Stanford Univ. Press 1968). For a discussion on the
de-Nazification policy in occupied Germany, see Edward N. Peterson, The
American Occupation of Germany 138-73 (Wayne State Univ. Press 1977).
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D. A ProsecutorialMistake?
How could a clear case of the use of slave labor in Auschwitz
have finished with such lenient judgment? It is presumed that by
late 1946 and early 1947, fiscal and administrative constraints were
forcing Taylor to finally begin the delayed trials without being
Many observers considered as the
properly prepared. 114
the fact that the Farben case was
error
Prosecution's main
15
as opposed to a war crimes case.'
case
antitrust
an
like
presented
Retrospectively, it is perhaps understandable that the Prosecution
believed it had a clear and easy case against a concern which had
built its own concentration camp in Auschwitz-itself, a name
which is today associated with pure evil. In his opening statement
Taylor said:
The crimes with which these men are charged were not
committed in rage, or under the stress of sudden
temptation; they were not the slips or lapses of otherwise
well-ordered men. One does not build a stupendous war
machine in a fit of passion. Or 16an Auschwitz factory
during a passing spasm of brutality."
DuBois, who was also in charge of the Prosecution, recognized
that the idea of showing a huge cartel responsible of crimes and
with ramifications everywhere from Bern to Bombay made the
Tribunal impatient after the third day. 117 Of the two volumes of
the condensed version of the trial in the Green Series, the first one
is entirely concerned with count one. The rest of the counts,
including the slave labor count, required just two-thirds of the
second volume. "Whatever the impact of this evidence may be on
the writing of history, it made little impression on two of the
judges. The evidence of this knowledge of Hitler's aggressive
intentions 'degenerates from proof to mere conjecture.""1

114. Mark E. Spicka, The Devil's Chemist on Trial: The American
ProsecutionofL G. Farbenat Nuremberg, 68 The Historian 2, 865, 877.
115. Borkin, supra note 29, at 141; Cf. Spicka, supra note 114, at 878
(asserting it was not because of the antitrust background of the Prosecutors as
suggested by Stockes).
116. 7 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 100.
117. DuBois, supra note 18, at 77 ("We had planned to show first the
defendants' places in the organization, then go to reconstruct their acts in
official relations to each other. Now we had to change the plan.").
118. Taylor, supranote 9, at 197.

522

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Reading DuBois' chronicle, it is easy to share his
disappointment with some of the judges' attitudes. 19 However,
the work of the Prosecution on this part of the trial somehow
exudes naivet6. 120
They were so convinced of Farben's
participation in the rebuilding of the German war machine that it
seemed the only concern of the Prosecution was to show how
intricate and detailed Farben's involvement in the chemical
industry had become in the world.1 2 1 The chemical conglomerate
had an active role in the Nazi regime. They used their position
among the German decision-makers to take advantage of
Germany's conquest of Europe, subjugating the chemical industry
in any territory occupied by the Nazi war machine. They turned a
blind eye to the meaning of the concentration camp Auschwitz as
the epitome
of all evil and to the mass murder carried out by the
22
Nazis.
The policy of the U.S. military occupation government in
Germany was subject to a variety of influences-domestic ones
like Congress, international like the position of the American
Allies, and the growing Cold War tensions. 123 Some authors felt
that the U.S. government gave clear signals. According to
Buscher, even a closeout date for finishing the trials was fixed for
June 30, 1948.124
How far was the majority influenced by all of these factors?
The sense of urgency and anxiety is palpable when reading the
case. The Tribunal seemed fastidious with the Prosecution and its
strategy 125 and constrained by the growing external dangers. At
one moment, Judge Morris uttered to the Prosecution:
Mr. Prosecutor, this organization, so far as record shows
here, was simply a big chemical, commercial and business
concern, the like of which there are many throughout the
world. Speaking for myself only, I am at a complete loss to
comprehend where documents of this kind are of the
slightest materiality to the charges. This trial is being
slowed down by a mass of contracts, minutes and letters
119. DuBois, supranote 18, at 92-96.
120. See Goetz, supra note 70, at 529.
121. DuBois, supranote 18, at 82-83.
122. Stokes, supra note 29, at 30; see generally Richard Sasuly, I.G. Farben
(Boni & Gaer 1947).
123. Gimbel, supranote 113.
124. Buscher, supra note 70, at 52.
125. 7 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 6, at 1391, 1585-86, 1591, 1595;
8 Trials of War Criminals, supranote 6, at 36, 63, 234, 244, 289.
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that seem to have such a slight bearing on any possible
concept of proof in this case.12
DuBois remembers:
I recall getting acquainted with Morris at a luncheon on the
first day of the trial. Looking around the once-bombsmashed ceiling, he'd shaken his head and said. "We have
to worry about the Russians now; it wouldn't surprise
1 27 me if
they overran the courtroom before we get through.'
The notion that Morris' judgment was affected by the Russian
menace seems to be confirmed by an unpublished letter from
128
a journalist after retirement,
to DuBois.that
Morris
Nuremberg,
asSpeaking
judge in with
Morris explained
I feel some people were tried who should not have been ....
They were a bunch of eager selfish big businessmen like you
would find in any country ....I had many bitter arguments
with several members29of the judicial panel and my name was
mud in Washington. 1
This comment synthesized the majority's opinion of Farben's
directors: just a bundle of greedy businessmen, extremely eager to
possess the chemical power of occupied Europe.
CONCLUSION

By 1951, all of the convicted defendants in Nuremberg's
Farbencase were free. Norbert Wollheim, a German citizen and
former slave laborer at Monowitz who had given testimony in the
126. DuBois, supranote 18, at 82.
127. Id. at 95.
128. See Hebert L. Meschke & Ted Smith, The North Dakota Supreme
Court: A Century of Advances, in 76 N.D. L. Rev. 217, 256-57 (2000).
According to this letter, Morris confirmed to DuBois: "I am glad, too, that your
book recognizes my appreciation of the Russian menace." Id. at 256. Dubois
answered Morris in a letter:
The second paragraph of your letter in which you state that "the Russians did
overrun the courtroom," highlights to me one point which I tried to make in
the concluding chapters of my book, namely, that in my judgement, the fear
of Russia and communism weighed so heavily on your mind that you grossly
misinterpreted, in good faith, many incidents.
Letter from Josiah E. DuBois to Honorable James Morris, Chief Justice of the
North Dakota Supreme Court (Apr. 9, 1953) (on file with the author).
129. See Lucille Hendrickson, Judge Morris Recalls Nuremberg, The
Bismark Trib. (Paul M. Hebert Archives, Louisiana State University).
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case, was dismayed by the laxity of the judgment. 130 In 1951, he
filed a claim against the group contending that his enslavement had
been consented to by Farben's directors. After obtaining a
favorable decision in June 1953 and on appeals in February 1957,
the Frankfurt Appeals Chamber summoned for an agreement
reaching a record sum of thirty million DM. The agreement was
conditioned on the passage of an act through Parliament
authorizing further claims against I.G. Farben. 13 1 More than 6,500
former slaves that worked in Buna received a sum between DM
2,500 and DM 5,000.132
One of the few American cases concerned with the Holocaust
was a case of another survivor of Monowitz whose indemnification
had been refused because he was neither a German national nor a
"refugee" at the time of his enslavement. 33 At the time of his
claim, Princz had American citizenship, but the court rejected the
argument that ius cogens violations amount to an implied waiver of
state immunity and refused to apply the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act, opting to recognizing the German-invoked
sovereign immunity. 134 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari
leaving the claimant without
any further procedural help, which
135
was strongly criticized.
The ghost of the unfinished past of the Farbencase continues
to haunt the present. In October 1998, the newly elected German
130. Ferencz, supra note 70, at 35.
131. LG and OLG Frankfurt Az. 5 U 122/53. See Karl Brozik, Die
Entschadigung von nationalsozialister Zwangsarbeit durch deutsche Firmen, in
Entschadigung fir NS-Zwangsarbeit--Rechtliche, historische und politsche
Aspekte 33-47 (Klaus Barwig et al. eds., Nomos 1998). See the so called
"Aufrufgesetz," in BGBI I 569 from May 27, 1957.
See also
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 7,
2004, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1804 (F.R.G)
(considering the constitutionality of the Foundation, "Remembrance,
Responsibility, and Future", cited supra note 4).
132. Brozik, supra note 131, at 43.
133. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1) (2002); Princz, 26 F.3d at 1184-85 (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
135. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 513 U.S. 1121, 115 S. Ct. 923
(1995). The House and Senate passed a unanimous resolution supporting Mr.
Princz. 141 Cong. Rec. E681-02 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (Statement of Mr.
Schumer).
Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign
Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 Mich.
J. Int'l L. 403 (1994-1995).
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Chancellor, Gerhard Schrtider, announced that his government was
prepared to support the establishment of a foundation to
compensate slave laborers. On July 17, 2000, a compensation
agreement for former concentration camp slaves and forced
laborers, including the I. G. Farben consortium, was signed by the
main negotiators representing the German Government, the firms
engaged in slave labor, and a Board of Trustees integrated by
representatives of Israel, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Chechnya, and
the U.S.A. This agreement led to the establishment of a foundation
created under German law called "Memory, Responsibility and
Future." 136 The work for the preparation of the Foundation
renewed the interest of scholars
in the activities of the Farben
137
group during the Nazi period.
The exploitation of prisoners' labor was not a new
development discovered by the I. G. Farben group during World
War II. However, never before had such a brutal reality of man's
inhumanity been shown. The Farben case displayed a cynical
scenario of greed and depravity. Regardless of the overwhelming
evidence of the Board's liability for the criminal decision to build
up a factory in the most notorious camp of extermination,
stubbornly the Prosecution engaged itself in a meaningless pursuit
of a conspiracy of industrialists with the German war machine,
undoubtedly weakening the accusation.
Hebert was deeply concerned with two of the main charges.
First, the one related to the count of aggression and conspiracy
which, at the very eve of the judgment's delivery, Hebert changed
into a concurring opinion with the majority. This change of mind
could be attributed to Hebert's belief that it made little sense to
136. See sources cited supra note 4. See Stuart E. Eizenstat, Imperfect
Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor and the Unfinished Business of World War
II 206-28 (Public Affairs 2003); Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The
Battle for Restitution in America's Courts 59-109 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2003).
137. Bernd C. Wagner, IG Auschwitz: Zwansarbeit und Vernichtung von
Hdftlingen des Lager Monowitz 1941-1945, Vol. 3, (K. G. Saur Vlg. 2000);
Mark Sporer, Unternehmen in National-Sozialismus (Beck 1998) and
Zwangsarbeit
unter
dem Hakenkreuz:
Auslindischer
Zivilarbeiter,
Kriegsgefangene und Hafitlinge im Deutschen Reich und im besetzen Europas
1939-1945" (Deutsche Vlg. Anstalt 2001); Christoph J Safferling,
Zwangsarbeiterentschadingungsgesetzund Grundgesetz, 34 Kritische Justiz 208
(2001); Sandro Blanke, Der lange Weg zur Entschddigung von NSZwangsarbeitern,34 Kritische Justiz 195 (2001); Roland Bank, Die Leistungen
an NS-Zwangsarbeiter durch die Stiftung "Erinnerung, Verantwortung und
Zukunft", in "Die Rechtstellung des Menschen im V61kerrecht," 83-114 (Mohr
2003).
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prosecute subalterns when the principals had been previously
acquitted by the IMT. Secondly, Hebert was deeply concerned
with the criminal liability of this group of industrialists who,
morally poisoned by greed and inhumanity, built up a factory in
one of the most paradigmatic and horrific extermination camps.
The lenient decision of the majority, without consistent legal
reasoning, should be seen as a blind bowing to the American
decision to bring to an end the prosecution of German war
criminals. We might wonder if the reconstruction of Germany was
not more than a plausible justification for this decision. The Cold
War had imposed its own speed to international relations and
mankind was engaged in the beginning of a new world order where
the killings perpetrated during World War II were no longer given
priority. Man's inhumanity to man was not new and the future
would show, decades later, repetition of acts presumed never to be
repeated again. The case was forgotten by history. The lonely
voice of Hebert endured, however, the passing of time.

